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I. INTRODUCTION
On the morning of October 5, 1995, just one month after the birth
of Wang He’s second son, ten Chinese government officials forcibly
entered his home.1 The officials held Mr. He against a wall, forced his
wife out of the house, and drove her to the hospital.2 Mr. He rented a
motorized tricycle3 and pedaled to the hospital as fast as he could. But
Mr. He was too late. Mr. He saw his wife wobbling out of the hospital
doors supported by two nurses.4 Mr. He and his wife looked at each
other, but neither could speak.5 That day, Mr. He walked out of the
hospital with a sterilization certificate in hand,6 and his wife with a scar
on her abdomen.7 Mr. He subsequently fled China on a smuggler’s boat.8
The Ninth Circuit, in addressing Mr. He’s asylum request on the
basis of his wife’s past persecution through involuntary sterilization,9
adopted the holding of In re C—Y—Z— that “the forced sterilization of
one spouse . . . is an act of persecution against the other spouse.”10 In the
Second Circuit case Lin v. U.S. Department of Justice, the asylum
applicants’ experiences with the harsh enforcement of China’s “onechild” policy were very similar to those of Mr. He.11 However, while the
Ninth Circuit held that Mr. He was automatically eligible for asylum,12
the Second Circuit in Lin held that spouses like Mr. He were not.13
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See He v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 593, 595 (9th Cir. 2003).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
He v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 593, 595 (9th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 593.
Id. at 605.
Lin v. Dep’t of Justice, 494 F.3d 296 (2d Cir. 2007).
He, 328 F.3d at 604.
Lin, 494 F.3d at 304.
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Lin created a split among the circuits by holding that the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“Board” or “BIA”14) erred by extending refugee
status to spouses of coercive population control (“CPC”) victims.15 The
amendment section 601(a) to the Immigration and Nationality Act
(hereinafter “CPC Refugee definition”16) specifically addresses this
issue.17 The amendment states that an individual who was persecuted or
has a well-founded fear of future persecution under CPC policies will be
“deemed to have been persecuted on account of political opinion.”18
The Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have all deferred to
the BIA’s interpretation of the CPC Refugee definition.19 Most recently,
the Third Circuit adopted the BIA’s interpretation of the CPC Refugee
definition in Chen v. Attorney General of the United States20 over a
vigorous dissent. The Second Circuit’s departure from this precedent
suggests that the issue is ripe for clarification by the Supreme Court or
Congress. This comment argues that the definition of CPC Refugee
should apply to both spouses.
Prior to the enactment of the CPC Refugee definition in 1996, there
was some controversy as to whether the “one-child” policy constituted
persecution on account of political opinion.21 In re Chang, one of the
most influential cases addressing the issue, held that victims of
persecution under the “one-child” policy could not establish a nexus to
any protected characteristic under the Immigration and Nationality Act.22
The 1996 amendment overturned Chang, establishing that a CPC victim
is entitled to a presumption of well-founded fear of persecution on
account of political opinion.23

14

See infra Part II.B.
Id. at 304.
16
See infra Part II.C.
17
Immigration and Nationality Act, § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006), as
amended by the Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,
Division C, Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104–208, §
601(a)(1), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009–689.
18
Id.
19
Li v. Ashcroft, 82 Fed. App’x 357, 358 (5th Cir. 2003) (unpublished per curiam
opinion); Huang v. Ashcroft, 113 Fed. App’x 695, 700 (6th Cir. 2004) (unpublished
opinion); Zhang v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 993, 1001 (7th Cir. 2006); He, 328 F.3d, at 604.
20
Chen v. Att’y Gen., 491 F.3d 100 (3d Cir. 2007).
21
CHARLES GORDON, STANLEY MAILMAN & STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR, IMMIGRATION
LAW AND PROCEDURE § 33.04, at 26 (2007).
22
In re Chang, 20 I. & N. Dec. 38 (BIA 1989).
23
Id.; GORDON ET AL., supra note 21.
15
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Chinese government officials strictly enforce the “one-child”
policy.24 A couple that does not comply often faces threats of fines,
property damage, and job loss, in addition to physical persecution such
as involuntarily sterilization and abortion.25 Chinese immigrants seeking
asylum in the United States based on persecution under the “one-child”
policy may qualify as refugees under the Immigration and Nationality
Act (“Act”).26 The BIA, in a number of precedential statutory
interpretations of the Immigration and Nationality Act and the CPC
Refugee definition amendment, has recognized a clear Congressional
intent to extend the scope of the Act’s protection to spouses.27 This
comment argues that courts should also interpret the Immigration and
Nationality Act in light of the United States’s family reunification policy,
“one of the principal goals” of U.S. immigration law.28
The BIA, in the case In re C—Y—Z—, held that one spouse can
establish past persecution on the basis of the other spouse’s coerced
abortion or sterilization.29 The Board supported its decision with strong
language from a 1996 Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”)
memorandum.30 Despite strong dissenting opinions in C—Y—Z—, in
2006 the BIA re-affirmed its holding in C—Y—Z— in the case In re S—
L—L—.31 There, the Board focused on the couple’s shared rights and the
overall purpose of the amendment, using support from the amendment’s
legislative history.32 These two Board decisions found that the spouse of
24
See Xiaorong Li, License to Coerce: Violence Against Women, State
Responsibility, and Legal Failures in China’s Family-Planning Program, 8 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 145, 152–55 (1996). See also infra Part II.A.
25
In re S—L—L—, 24 I. & N. Dec. 1, 2006 BIA. LEXIS 21, at *14 (BIA Sept. 19,
2006) (citing BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF
STATE, CHINA—PROFILE OF ASYLUM CLAIMS AND COUNTRY CONDITIONS 41 (Oct. 2005)
at 21).
26
Immigration and Nationality Act, § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006), as
amended by the Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,
Division C, Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104–208, §
601(a)(1), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009–689.
27
See In re C—Y—Z—, 21 I. & N. Dec. 915 (BIA 1997); In re S—L—L—, 24 I. &
N. Dec. 1, 2006 BIA LEXIS 21 (BIA Sept. 19, 2006).
28
Fornalik v. Perryman, 223 F.3d 523, 525 (7th Cir. 2000); see also Fiallo v. Bell,
430 U.S. 787 (1977); Lau v. Kiley, 563 F.2d 543, 545 (2d Cir. 1977) (recognizing that
the Immigration and Nationality Act is designed to reunite families); Perales v. Casillas,
903 F.2d 1043, 1051 (5th Cir. 1990) (stating that Congress enacted the visa preference
provisions to reunite families); Kaho v. Ilchert, 765 F.2d 877, 879 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)
(stating that reuniting families is one of the basic objectives of the Immigration and
Nationality Act).
29
In re C—Y—Z—, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 917.
30
Id.
31
In re S—L—L—, 24 I. & N. Dec. 1, 2006 BIA LEXIS 21, at *1 (BIA Sept. 19,
2006).
32
Id. at *8, 10.
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a victim directly persecuted through CPC policies is per se eligible for
asylum; however, circuit courts have struggled to determine precisely
who is eligible for asylum under the CPC Refugee definition when
applying it to different types of personal relationships.
While both the Ninth and Seventh Circuits have expanded the scope
of protection of the CPC Refugee definition to spouses, the Third Circuit
has gone beyond the BIA’s interpretations. In He v. Ashcroft, the Ninth
Circuit upheld the BIA’s interpretation, reiterating the ruling in C—Y—
Z— that “the forced sterilization of one spouse . . . is an act of
persecution against the other spouse.”33 The Ninth Circuit, in Ma v.
Ashcroft, also stretched the scope of relief of the CPC Refugee
amendment to protect husbands in government-sanctioned marriages, as
well as marriages that would be sanctioned “but for China’s [ ] [CPC]
policies.”34 Although deviating a bit from the scope of the BIA rule, the
court focused its interpretation on avoiding “the separation of a husband
and wife, the break-up of a family, a result that is at odds not only with
the provision at issue here, but also with significant parts of our overall
immigration policy.”35
The Seventh Circuit in Zhang v. Gonzales expanded protection to a
former spouse, noting that the husband suffered a loss that the
subsequent break-up of the marriage could not lessen.36 Most recently,
the Third Circuit upheld the BIA’s interpretation of the CPC Refugee
definition in Chen v. Attorney General of the United States.37 The court
based its conclusion on the amendment’s legislative history,
considerations of the loss of reproductive opportunities by the couple,
sympathetic harm experienced by the husband, and China’s punishment
of married couples for violations of the “one-child” policy.38
Despite the developing trend of expanding the scope of the CPC
Refugee definition, the Second Circuit took a comparatively narrow
view. Lin held that spouses of involuntary abortion or sterilization
victims could not obtain automatic refugee status under the CPC Refugee
definition.39 In so holding, the court focused on the language of the CPC
Refugee definition but misinterpreted its legislative history.40 By hastily
neglecting to follow a BIA interpretation that had been relied on for the
33
He v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 593, 604 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing In re C—Y—Z—, 21 I.
& N. Dec. 915, 919–20 (BIA 1997)).
34
Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 561 (9th Cir. 2004).
35
Id.
36
Zhang v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 993, 1001 (7th Cir. 2006).
37
Chen v. Att’y Gen., 491 F.3d 100, 108 (3d Cir. 2007).
38
Id.
39
Lin, 494 F.3d 296 at 300.
40
Id. at 310.
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past decade, Lin failed to consider the crucial policy considerations
informing the provision and the effects the decision would have on
thousands of lives.41 Because of Lin, spouses of individuals persecuted
under CPC policies are no longer entitled to asylum in the Second
Circuit. The Lin decision has already destroyed the lives of thirty-three
families.42
This comment argues that if the Supreme Court were to resolve the
circuit split, it should interpret the CPC Refugee definition in favor of the
BIA’s interpretation. The BIA’s viewpoint is entitled to Chevron43
deference and is reasonable.44 Moreover, the legislative history of the
CPC Refugee definition supports the BIA’s interpretation.45 The BIA’s
interpretation of the CPC Refugee definition also provides an additional
basis of relief to spouses of CPC victims when remedies under the
derivative asylum statute are unavailable.46

41

Id.
See, e.g., Wang v. Mukasey, No. 06–5191–ag , 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 3298, at *2
(2d Cir. Feb.15, 2008) (“Wang is not per se eligible for asylum on account of his wife’s
alleged forced abortion procedure.”); Qian v. United States Dep’t of Justice, No. 06–
5729–ag , 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 3294, at *3 (2d Cir. Feb. 15, 2008) (“Qian was not
entitled to asylum based solely on his girlfriend’s forced abortion, regardless of the
couple’s marital status.”); Zheng v. Mukasey, No. 07–1613–ag, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS
3138, at *4 (2d Cir. Feb. 13, 2008) (“Zheng did not claim that he participated in any form
of resistance to China’s family planning policy other than impregnating his girlfriend,
and therefore his ‘other resistance’ claim fails under Shi Liang Lin, 494 F.3d at 312 (“[I]t
is clear that the fact that an individual’s spouse has been forced to have an abortion or
undergo involuntary sterilization does not, on its own, constitute resistance to coercive
family planning policies.”); Chen v. INS, No. 06–5707–ag, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 2718,
at *2 (2d Cir. Feb. 7, 2008) (“[In Lin,] [w]e held that 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42), the statute
on which Chen relies, does not apply to a spouse such as him who was not personally
subject to coercive birth control measures and who was not personally mistreated as a
consequence of opposing the mistreatment of a spouse. We are obligated to apply this
intervening precedent.”); Weng v. Mukasey, No. 05–4794–ag, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS
1909, at *2 (2d Cir. Jan. 29, 2008) (“The agency correctly determined that Weng’s wife’s
forced abortion does not constitute past persecution of Weng.”); Jiang v. Mukasey, No.
07–2067–ag, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 314, at *2 (2d Cir. Jan. 8, 2008) (“Jiang is not per se
eligible for asylum based on the forced abortion that was allegedly inflicted upon his
wife, Chen, whom he married in a traditional Chinese wedding ceremony.”).
43
See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43
(1984); see also infra Part II.B.
44
See Li v. Ashcroft, 82 Fed. App’x 357, 358 (5th Cir. 2003) (unpublished per
curiam opinion); Huang v. Ashcroft, 113 Fed. App’x 695, 700 (6th Cir. 2004)
(unpublished opinion); Zhang v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 993, 1001 (7th Cir. 2006); He v.
Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 593, 604 (9th Cir. 2003).
45
Chen v. Att’y Gen., 491 F.3d 100, 108 (3d Cir. 2007).
46
Id. at 325 (Katzman, J., concurring) (See Chen v. Att’y Gen., 491 F.3d 100, 107
(3d Cir. 2007) (“We . . . do not believe that the existence of derivative asylum status
under a statute implies that Congress intended to foreclose additional pathways to asylum
specific to spouses.”).
42
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Alternatively, Congress should effectively overturn Lin by
amending the CPC Refugee definition to explicitly include spouses,
because the Chinese government places responsibility on both the
husband and the wife for complying with the “one-child” policy.47
Accordingly, the CPC Refugee definition should protect persecuted
wives and their husbands. In addition, Congress should take action
because Lin contradicts United States (“U.S.”) family reunification
policy. If Congress were to amend the statute to explicitly include
spouses, it would establish a clear delineation for asylum in marriage,48
which promotes certainty in the application of the CPC Refugee
definition, an especially desirable feature in immigration law.49 For all
of these reasons, Lin should be overturned and the Supreme Court or
Congress should articulate that the CPC Refugee Definition includes
spouses of victims subject to CPC.
II. THE UNITED STATES GRANTS ASYLUM TO VICTIMS OF CHINA’S ONECHILD POLICY
Every year, thousands of Chinese immigrants who have faced or
fear China’s “one-child” policy seek asylum in the United States under
the Immigration and Nationality Act.50 Those who do not comply with
the “one-child” policy face not only physical persecution, but social
ostracism and other pressures.51 Through the CPC Refugee definition,
Congress expanded the scope of the Immigration and Nationality Act by
explicitly including CPC in the definition of persecution on account of
political opinion.52 Congress enacted this legislation to put an end to the
regulatory uncertainty about whether a CPC victim was eligible for
asylum under the Immigration and Nationality Act.53 A 1996 INS
memorandum regarding the new legislation also stated that “an applicant
47
48

2006).

XIAN FA [Constitution] art.49 (1982) (P.R.C.).
In re S—L—L—, 24 I. & N. Dec. 1, 2006 BIA LEXIS 21, at *21 (BIA Sept. 19,

49
Lin v. Dep’t of Justice, 494 F.3d 296, 316 (2d Cir. 2007) (Katzman, J.,
concurring), (“[I]t would be unsound for each of the several Courts of Appeals to
elaborate a potentially nonuniform body of law”) (describing uniformity as “especially
desirable in cases such as these”) Id. at 316. (citing Jian Hui Shao v. BIA, 465 F.3d 497,
502 (2d Cir. 2006)). Id.
50
See OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY:
ANNUAL FLOW REPORT: REFUGEES AND ASYLEES: 2006, 4 tbl. 6 (2007).
51
In re S—L—L—, 24 I. & N. Dec. 1, 2006 BIA LEXIS 21, *14 (BIA Sept. 19,
2006) (citing BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEPT. OF
STATE, CHINA—PROFILE OF ASYLUM CLAIMS AND COUNTRY CONDITIONS 41 (Oct. 2005)
at 21).
52
Id.
53
GORDON ET AL., supra note 21.
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whose spouse was forced to undergo an abortion or involuntary
sterilization has suffered past persecution, and may thereby be eligible
for asylum under the terms of the new refugee definition.”54 Congress,
through expanding the statute, did not intend for the amendment to result
in the separation of families, which is contrary to the core goals of the
U.S. family reunification policy.55
A. China’s One-Child Policy
The Chinese government implemented its “one-child” birth control
policy to resolve a significant overpopulation problem.56 The “one-child”
policy limits most couples to bearing only one child.57 The policy and its
vigorous enforcement by the Chinese government in urban areas “has
had a great effect on the lives of nearly a quarter of the world’s
population for a quarter of a century.”58 The Chinese government began
the “one-child” policy in 1979, claiming that the policy would help
China achieve its goal of becoming a voluntary small-family culture.59
This policy is still in force.60
Generally, the “one-child” policy restricts all couples to bearing
only one child.61 However, the Chinese government will allow certain
couples, for example those having only one daughter, to have a second
child after five years.62 Despite this, the Chinese government strictly
forbids third and higher-order childbearing.63
The “one-child” policy “depends on virtually universal access to
contraception and abortion.”64 One study indicated that “a total of eightyseven percent of all married women use contraception”65 as compared
54

Memorandum from David A. Martin, Gen. Counsel, Immigration & Naturalization
Serv., Asylum Based On Coercive Family Planning Policies—Section 601 of the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996 (Oct. 21, 1996)
available at http://immigration.com/news/a-family-planning.html.
55
See cases cited, supra note 28.
56
Therese Hesketh, Li Lu, & Zhu Wei Xing, The Effect of China’s One-Child Family
Policy after 25 Years, 353 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1171 (2005).
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
XIAN FA [Constitution] art. 25, 49 (1982) (P.R.C.); see generally Xiaorong Li,
License to Coerce: Violence Against Women, State Responsibility, and Legal Failures in
China’s Family-Planning Program, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 145, 152–55 (1996).
61
Hesketh, supra note 56.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id. (citing Yin Q, Theses collection of 2001 National Family Planning and
Reproductive Health Survey. Beijing: China Population Publishing House, 116–26
(2003)).
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with “about one third in most developing countries.”66 The Chinese
government offers no choice in contraception for most women.67 A recent
study found that eighty percent of women “had no choice and just
accepted the contraceptive method recommended by the family-planning
worker” employed by the Chinese government.68 Those women who
choose to continue a non-sanctioned pregnancy are often hesitant to use
obstetric services “because [these women] fear they will face pressure to
have an abortion or [will be] fine[d] for violating the one-child policy.”69
Often without the assistance of any trained personnel, many nonsanctioned deliveries of babies occur at home.70 This practice “is
associated with the risk of maternal or neonatal mortality.”71 In 1990, a
study carried out in the rural province of Sichuan, China reported “a
doubling of maternal deaths for unapproved pregnancies” as compared
with those pregnancies sanctioned by the Chinese government.72
The Chinese government places responsibility for adherence to
family planning policies on both the husband and wife.73 The
Constitution of the People’s Republic of China stipulates that the state
should promote the practice of family planning.74 A married couple that
does not voluntarily submit to an abortion may face social ostracism and
other pressures.75 Historically, such couples have been threatened with
fines, property damage or confiscation, demotion at work, “job loss, or
other economic sanctions for refusing to agree to an abortion.”76
However, the Chinese government may ultimately impose an abortion,
sterilization, or government infanticide upon the couple if the couple
refuses to comply with the policy.77

66

Hesketh, supra note 56.
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 1172.
70
Id.
71
Therese Hesketh, Li Lu, & Zhu Wei Xing, The Effect of China’s One-Child Family
Policy after 25 Years, 353 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1171 (2005).
72
Id. at 1172.
73
XIAN FA [Constitution] art.49 (1982) (P.R.C.) (Art. 49, entitled “Marriage, the
family, and mother and child are protected by the state” indicates, in relevant part, that
“[b]oth husband and wife have the duty to practice family planning.”).
74
Id. at art. 25.
75
Id.
76
Id. See also In re S—L—L—, 24 I. & N. Dec. 1, 2006 BIA LEXIS 21, *14 (BIA
Sept. 19, 2006) (citing BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEPT.
OF STATE, CHINA—PROFILE OF ASYLUM CLAIMS AND COUNTRY CONDITIONS 41 (Oct.
2005) at 21).
77
In re S—L—L—, 24 I. & N. Dec. 1, 2006 BIA LEXIS 21, *14 (BIA Sept. 19, 2006)
67
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B. The Board of Immigration Appeals is the Most Competent Entity to
Handle Asylum Cases
With regard to the application and interpretation of immigration
laws, the BIA “is the highest administrative body [in the United
States].”78 The Attorney General, who has power determine deportation,
exclusion, and removal cases,79 established the BIA as an appellate body
to review decisions of immigration judges and district directors of the
Department of Homeland Security.80 The Board, composed of eleven
Board Members including the Chairman and Vice Chairman,
“identif[ies] clear errors of fact or errors of law in decisions under
review, . . . provide[s] guidance and direction to the immigration judges,
and . . . issue[s] precedential interpretations as an appellate body.”81 The
Board also makes unpublished decisions that only bind the parties in the
decision.82 In contrast, the BIA’s published decisions serve as legal
precedent that binds immigration judges unless the Attorney General
modifies or overrules the decision.83 Through these precedential
decisions, the BIA has contributed to the creation of a considerable
amount of immigration law.84
Increasing case loads led to a number of reforms and revisions of
the Board’s structure over time. In 1999, further increases prompted the
Attorney General to implement streamlining initiatives to facilitate
appeals for legally and factually uncomplicated cases by assigning the
cases for adjudication by one BIA member.85 In 2002, the Attorney
General implemented more reforms, which mandated review by a single
BIA member of certain specified types of cases.86
78

Board of Immigration Appeals, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/biainfo.htm (last
visited Feb. 8, 2008).
79
CHARLES GORDON, STANLEY MAILMAN & STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR, IMMIGRATION
LAW AND PROCEDURE § 3.05, at 1 (2007).
80
8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d) (2006).
81
Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case
Management, 67 Fed. Reg. 54,878, 54,880 (Aug. 26, 2002).
82
BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS PRACTICE MANUAL (2004), available at
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/qapracmanual/pracmanual/chap1.pdf.
83
8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g) (2006).
84
Evelyn H. Cruz, Symposium: Globalization, Security & Human Rights:
Immig[]ration in the Twenty-First Century: Double the Injustice, Twice the Harm: The
Impact of the Board of Immigration Appeals’s Summary Affirmance Procedures, 16
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 481, 499–500 (2005).
85
GORDON ET AL., supra note 79, at 2 (citing Executive Office for Immigration
Review; Board of Immigration Appeals: Streamlining, 64 Fed. Reg. 56,135 (Oct. 18,
1999)).
86
Id. (citing Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case
Management, 67 Fed. Reg. 54,878 (Aug. 26, 2002) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)
(2006))).
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Some think of these changes not as “reforms” but as political
moves to deter immigrants from seeking so many appeals, and have
challenged them on due process grounds under the Administrative
Procedure Act (“APA”).87 In addition, the adoption of the CPC Refugee
definition is also viewed by some as imposing greater restrictions on
those seeking asylum. For example, the amendment implemented a one
year filing limit and restrictions on judicial review.88 One scholar also
criticized the executive branch for interpreting immigration laws in “an
exceedingly narrow manner.”89
BIA decisions are entitled to limited judicial review,90 and are
entitled to Chevron deference for issues of statutory interpretation.91 The
Board, however, “is not bound by decisions of the lower federal courts . .
. unless the Board accepts [a district court’s] conclusions;” however, the
circuit law governing the case binds the BIA.92 Moreover, just because
the government fails to appeal a BIA decision “does not necessarily
indicate acquiescence, since the failure to appeal may be based on
inadequacy of the record or other factors unrelated to the merits.”93
Precedential Board decisions “apply to all proceedings involving the
adjudicated issues” unless the Board itself, Congress, the Attorney
General, or a federal court modifies or overrules the Board’s decision.94
BIA decisions “have become more meaningful as Congress has
sought to limit the availability of circuit court appellate review.”95
87
See Capital Area Immigrants’ Rights Coalition v. United States, 264 F. Supp. 2d
14 (D.D.C. 2003); see also Albathani v. INS, 318 F.3d 365 (1st Cir. 2003).
88
Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006), as
amended by the Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(“IIRIRA”), Division C, Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No.
104–208, § 601(a)(1), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009–689.
89
See generally Lori A. Nessel, Article: Forced to Choose: Torture, Family
Reunification, and United States Immigration Policy, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 897, 944 n.303
(2005) (noting that “the BIA has interpreted key terms under the Torture Convention in
an unduly restrictive manner”) Id.
90
See GORDON ET AL., supra note 79, at 10.
91
See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
The Supreme Court in Chevron noted that “[i]f the intent of Congress is clear, that is the
end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Id. at 842–43. See also INS v. CardozaFonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 447–48 (1987). Under this first inquiry, “[s]ilence on a particular
matter germane to the provisions of a statute suggests a gap of the sort that the
administering agency may fill.” Chen v. Att’y Gen., 491 F.3d 100, 107 (3d Cir. 2007).
The Court in Chevron asserted that only “if the statute is silent or ambiguous,” should a
court turn to the second inquiry and ask whether the BIA’s interpretation represents “a
permissible construction of the statute.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
92
GORDON ET AL., supra note 79, at 11.
93
Id.
94
Id. at 12.
95
Cruz, supra note 84.
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Pursuant to Congress’s enactment of a series of laws, the circuit courts
were denied of the power to review a number of types of decisions.96 As
a result, the last forum an immigrant can visit for relief is often the
BIA.97 Despite this, “circuit courts have not been overly concerned about
the BIA’s summary affirmance procedures” because the circuit courts
trust that remanding the case to the immigration courts corrects any
errors.98
Some have referred to this process of “remand, remand, remand”
akin to a procedural “ping-pong” game where individuals regard the BIA
as a mere stepping stone to review from the circuit courts, with nominal
Board review.99 Although the BIA has reported that its backlog has been
reduced as a result, “the circuit courts’ backlog of immigration cases has
soared as immigrants discontent with summary affirmances seek a fair
forum.”100 The Seventh Circuit has even criticized the BIA for
overlooking its own precedents and causing further litigation.101 In the
Seventh Circuit case Iao v. Gonzales,102 the court cited to instances
where the BIA had simply affirmed immigration judges’ opinions that
contained “manifest errors of fact and logic.”103 These errors cause
concern for some circuit courts as to whether the BIA “lacks the national
oversight and guidance that the BIA once provided.”104
Despite criticisms of the summary affirmance procedures, the
Board clearly has greater institutional competence than the circuit courts
to interpret immigration law consistently with Congressional policy goals
96
Id. (noting that the Immigration Reform Act of 1996 denied the circuit courts the
power to address certain types of cases).
97
Id.
98
Id. at 508 (citing Falcon Carriche v. Ashcroft: “the most serious risk of erroneous
removal of an alien arises from the fact that the procedures conceal the basis for the
BIA’s decision.” Cruz noted, “The risk, however, according to Judge McKeown, can be
mitigated by remanding those cases and through the BIA’s own procedures to correct
mistakes through motions to reconsider”) Id.
99
Lin v. Dep’t of Justice, 494 F.3d 296, 313 (2d Cir. 2007); Cruz, supra note 84 at
508.
100
Cruz, supra note 84, at 508 (citing Office of Planning & Analysis, Executive
Office for Immigration Review FY2003: Statistical Yearbook U1 (2004) and Dorsey &
Whitney LLP, Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case
Management (2003) at app. 27. (noting that appeals to circuit courts have climbed from
an average of 300 a month per circuit to over 800 per month)).
101
Iao v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 530, 533–36 (7th Cir. 2005) (referring to a number of
circuits’ citations to six types of errors committed by immigration judges).
102
Id.
103
Id. at 535.
104
See Lory Diana Rosenberg, Aggressive Circuit Court or Administrative Neglect:
Just Who is Failing to Follow BIA Asylum Precedent?—Part I: Membership in a
Particular Social Group and Homosexuality, 10–9 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL., May 1,
2005, at 3.
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and objectives. Under Chevron deference, the BIA is vested with gapfilling authority in the event of statutory silence on a matter.105 The
Supreme Court would not have granted such a deferential standard of
review to BIA interpretations if the Court believed that the agency and
the circuits were equivalent in terms of institutional competence when
deciding issues of immigration law.
C. Congress Amends the Refugee Definition to Respond to China’s OneChild Policy
The Refugee Act of 1980 implemented Article 1 of the United
Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees within the United
States, and provided asylum protection to individuals meeting the
Immigration and Nationality Act’s definition of “refugee.”106 The
Refugee Act defines asylum as “a form of protection that allows
individuals who are in the United States to stay . . . and eventually to
adjust their status to lawful permanent resident.”107
The statute requires an individual to prove three elements to qualify
for asylum.108 The first element is persecution, which is highly factdependent and must be determined on a case-by-case basis. In order to
constitute persecution, the “conduct in question . . . must rise above the
level of mere ‘harassment.’”109 The second element is a well-founded
fear of persecution, which may be shown by past persecution or a fear of
future harm.110 The third element is a causal connection between the
persecution and one of five enumerated grounds: “race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.”111 In the past, immigrants fearing persecution because of
China’s “one-child” policy have argued that they were singled out
because of political opinion in order to satisfy the Immigration and
Nationality Act’s definition of “refugee.” 112 This argument was initially
met with some resistance by the BIA.
105

Chen v. Att’y Gen., 491 F.3d 100, 107 (3d Cir. 2007).
Immigration and Nationality Act, § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006), as
added by the Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96–212, § 201(a), 94 Stat. 102.
107
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services: Asylum, available at
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?
vgnextoid=3a82ef4c766fd010VgnVCM1000000ecd190aRCRD&vgnextchannel=3a82ef
4c766fd010VgnVCM1000000ecd190aRCRD.
108
Immigration and Nationality Act, § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006), as
added by the Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96–212, § 201(a), 94 Stat. 102.
109
Sofinet v. INS, 196 F.3d 742, 746 (7th Cir. 1999).
110
Immigration and Nationality Act, § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006), as
added by the Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96–212, § 201(a), 94 Stat. 102.
111
Id.
112
Id.
106
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The BIA addressed the issue of whether people seeking asylum
based on China’s “one-child” policy constituted persecution based on
political opinion, in the case In re Chang.113 The BIA ruled that China’s
“one-child” policy did not amount to persecution on its face because the
applicant was unable to establish a nexus between the persecution and a
protected characteristic.114 The BIA stated that a persecution claim could
prevail only if China selectively applied the “one-child” policy based on
“race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a
particular social group.”115 This language in Chang implied that an
individual’s violation of the “one-child” policy could not be an
expression of his or her political opinion.116
In response to Chang and similar Board decisions, seven years later
in 1996, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”) section 601(a).117 In this provision,
Congress enlarged the scope of the Immigration and Nationality Act by
expressly including CPC within the definition of a refugee.118 The
amendment effectively overruled Chang.119 Specifically, the amendment
states that an individual who was persecuted or has a well founded fear
of future persecution under CPC policies will be “deemed to have been
persecuted on account of political opinion.”120 In light of this statutory
change, courts have struggled to interpret just exactly who is eligible for
asylum under the new legislation, particularly when legally-married
spouses, as well as boyfriends and fiancés of women subjected to
coercive population controls, attempt to obtain refugee status.121

113

In re Chang, 20 I. & N. Dec. 38 (BIA 1989).
Id.
115
Id. at 44.
116
See id.
117
Immigration and Nationality Act, § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006), as
amended by the Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRIRA), Division C, Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No.
104–208, § 601(a)(1), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009–689.
118
Id.
119
See In re Chang, 20 I. & N. Dec. 38 (BIA 1989).
120
Immigration and Nationality Act, § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006), as
amended by the Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(“IIRIRA”), Division C, Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No.
104–208, § 601(a)(1), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009–689.
121
See Chen v. Att’y Gen., 491 F.3d 100 (3d Cir. 2007); Lin v. Dep’t of Justice, 494
F.3d 296, 299 (2d Cir. 2007).
114
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D. The BIA, the Courts, and Congress Have Endorsed an Immigration
Policy That Favors U.S. Family Reunification
The Supreme Court and various circuit courts have acknowledged
that family unity remains “one of the principal goals of the statutory and
regulatory apparatus” in U.S. immigration law.122 Both the BIA and the
courts have recognized that persecution of one member of a family
amounts to persecution of the nuclear family as one entity.123 The BIA
has stated that, for asylum purposes, the family is considered to be a
particular social group.124 The ability of families to unite after traumatic
interference with fundamental human rights is a dominant focus of
immigration policy in the United States.125 The BIA and the courts also
recognize the family “as the prototypical social group that warrants
protection from persecution in asylum jurisprudence.”126
Family reunification policy may sometimes be at odds with
immigration law policy. One scholar, Lori Nessel, has noted that claim
interpretation involving international protection from persecution must
take into account that “withholding of deportation alone is an insufficient
mechanism for restoring the human dignity that torture or persecution
strips away.”127 Professor Nessel remarked that, only with the presence
of a victim’s spouse can the victim facilitate with the emotional healing
and assimilation processes.128 Her argument stresses that family

122

See cases cited, supra note 28.
See Tchoukhrova v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2005); In re S—L—L—,
24 I. & N. Dec. 1, 2006 BIA LEXIS 21, *13 (BIA Sept. 19, 2006).
124
In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985).
125
Abebe v. Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 755, 764 (9th Cir. 2004) (Ferguson, J., dissenting)
(quoting THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP:
PROCESS AND POLICY 319 (4th ed. 1998)). In addition, international human rights law
recognizes family reunification rights—the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
specifies that “[t]he family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is
entitled to protection by society and the State.” Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d. Sess., Pt. 1, P 16(3), U.N. Doc. A/RES/217 (Dec. 10,
1948). See also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art.
23, 99 U.N.T.S. 171, 179 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976); International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, art. 10(1), 993
U.N.T.S. 4, 7 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) (“The widest possible protection and
assistance should be accorded to the family, which is the natural and fundamental group
unit of society . . . .”); African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted June 27,
1981, art. 18, 21 I.L.M. 58 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986) (“The family shall be the
natural unit and basis of society.”).
126
Lori A. Nessel, Forced to Choose: Torture, Family Reunification, and United
States Immigration Policy, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 897, 940 (2005).
127
Id.
128
Id.
123
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reunification is the only way a persecution victim could have his or her
dignity restored.129
The derivative asylum statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3), reflects
Congress’s encouragement of family unity.130 According to Lin, section
1158(b)(3)(A) states:
[A]n individual whose spouse or parent has been granted asylum
on the basis of having undergone or been threatened with the
prospect of a forced abortion or sterilization is automatically
eligible for derivative asylum: “[a] spouse or child . . . of an alien
who is granted asylum under this subsection may, if not
otherwise eligible for asylum under this section, be granted the
same status as the alien if accompanying, or following to join,
such alien.”131

Here, Congress allowed a spouse or child to obtain automatic derivative
asylum on the basis of a grant of asylum to the individual persecuted
under a CPC policy. The Federal Register indicates that “[d]erivative
benefits for refugees and asylees are intended to expediently reunite
families in order for them to make the difficult transition to a new life
with the support of their immediate family members by avoiding lengthy
delays due to visa quotas.”132 According to Lin, under section
1158(b)(3)(A), Congress first extends protection to the direct victim,
then to the spouse and their children.133 Congress created this structure to
“encourage[ ] couples to remain together, or, in circumstances where this
is not possible, facilitate[ ] reunion.”134 While the spouse of an asylee
may achieve derivative asylum status, section 1158(b)(3) “does not allow
one spouse to stand in the shoes of the other to independently obtain
asylum based on a threat to the other spouse.”135
In summary, Chinese immigrants seeking asylum in the U.S. on
account of persecution based on the “one-child” policy look to qualify as
a “refugee” under the CPC Refugee definition. The BIA has issued a
number of precedential statutory interpretations of the Immigration and
Nationality Act and the 1996 amendment136 and recognized that
Congress, by explicitly including CPC in the definition of persecution on
129

Id.
Lin v. Dep’t of Justice, 494 F.3d 296, 312 (2d Cir. 2007).
131
Id. at 312.
132
Procedures for Filing a Derivative Petition (Form I–730) for a Spouse and
Unmarried Children of a Refugee/Asylee, 63 Fed. Reg. 3,792, 3,793 (Jan. 27, 1998).
133
Lin, 494 F.3d at 312.
134
Id.
135
Chen v. Att’y Gen., 491 F.3d 100, 105 (3d Cir. 2007).
136
See In re C—Y—Z—, 21 I. & N. Dec. 915 (BIA 1997); In re S—L—L—, 24 I. &
N. Dec. 1, 2006 BIA LEXIS 21 (BIA Sept. 19, 2006).
130
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account of political opinion, clearly meant to extend the scope of the
Immigration and Nationality Act’s protection.137 Because family unity
remains “one of the principal goals” of U.S. immigration law and the
CPC Refugee definition has been interpreted in a way that effectuates
these goals, it is questionable whether Congress intended the separation
of families.
III. APPLICATION OF THE CPC REFUGEE DEFINITION BY THE BIA
A. In re C—Y—Z—
Soon after Congress amended the Immigration and Nationality Act
with the CPC Refugee definition, the BIA decided In re C—Y—Z—.138 In
this case, Chinese government officials forcibly sterilized the applicant’s
wife, who chose to remain in China with the couple’s children.139 The
threshold issue on appeal was whether an asylum applicant could
establish past persecution of one spouse because of coerced abortion or
sterilization of the other spouse.140 The immigration judge denied the
applicant’s petition for asylum on the basis that the applicant could not
establish past persecution or a reasonable fear of future persecution.141
On appeal, the BIA reversed, holding that one spouse can establish
past persecution on the basis of the other spouse’s coerced abortion or
sterilization.142 To reach that decision, the Board cited to the CPC
Refugee definition language stating that an individual who was
persecuted or has a well founded fear of future persecution under CPC
policies will be “deemed to have been persecuted on account of political
opinion”143 and also considered a 1996 I.N.S. memorandum stating that
“an applicant whose spouse was forced to undergo an abortion or
involuntary sterilization has suffered past persecution, and may thereby
be eligible for asylum under the terms of the new refugee definition.”144
137
In re S—L—L—, 24 I. & N. Dec. 1, 2006 BIA LEXIS 21, at *10–11 (BIA Sept.
19, 2006).
138
In re C—Y—Z—, 21 I. & N. Dec. 915 (BIA 1997) (Rosenberg, B.M., concurring).
139
Id. at 916.
140
Id. at 917.
141
Id. at 916.
142
Id.
143
Immigration and Nationality Act, § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006), as
amended by the Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,
Division C, Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104–208, §
601(a)(1), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009–689.
144
Memorandum from David A. Martin, Gen. Counsel, Immigration & Naturalization
Serv., Asylum Based On Coercive Family Planning Policies—Section 601 of the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996 (Oct. 21, 1996)
available at http://immigration.com/news/a-family-planning.html.
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The BIA additionally noted that the purpose of the 1996 amendment was
to “afford refugee status to persons whose fundamental human rights
were violated by a government’s application of its coercive family
planning policy.”145
In a concurring opinion, Board Member Lory Rosenberg agreed,
noting the specific statutory language, but also “the relevant precedent
decisions of this Board, the Federal courts, and the Supreme Court.”146
Board Member Rosenberg added that the existence of the CPC Refugee
definition “does not obviate the applicability of existing standards and
principles which make up established refugee doctrine.”147 She argued
that one who opposes or resists the “one-child” policy because he or she
believes that it is wrong holds a political opinion.148 As such, the
persecutor does not necessarily achieve his objective upon sterilizing the
couple, as there is still a basis for persecution motivated by the victim’s
failure to conform as well as the “encouragement of others not to do
so.”149 Moreover, the fact that an asylum applicant witnesses or
experiences a family member’s persecution also would tend to support
the applicant’s own fear of future persecution.150
Several of the board members dissented from the opinion. The
dissent by Board Member Filppu argued for remand to determine
whether the applicant was entitled to asylum and to examine the “murky”
reasoning behind the I.N.S.’s position on “joint spousal persecution.”151
Board Member Vacca opined in his dissent that the applicant did not
show past persecution or well founded fear of future persecution because
the statute specifically includes only those individuals who were forced
to be sterilized or have an abortion, or those who were persecuted for
failure to do so.152 Board Member Villageliu also dissented based on his
views that the BIA should interpret the statute narrowly in light of the
1,000 annual cap on asylum grants based on resistance to CPC
policies.153 He further argued that the courts should also construe the
145

Coercive Population Control in China: Hearings Before the Subcomm. On Int’l
Operations & Human Rights of the House Comm. On Int’l Relations, 104th Cong (1995).
146
In re C—Y—Z—, 21 I. & N. Dec. 915, 920 (BIA 1997) (Rosenberg, B.M.,
concurring).
147
Id.
148
Id. at 922.
149
Id. at 923.
150
Id. at 926.
151
In re C—Y—Z—, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 928–29 (Filppu, B.M., dissenting in part).
152
In re C—Y—Z—, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 933 (Vacca, B.M., dissenting).
153
In re C—Y—Z—, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 936 (Villageliu, B.M., dissenting). The 1000
annual cap placed on the number of asylees admitted pursuant to section 601(a) has been
repealed. See REAL ID Act of 2005, Div. B of Pub. L. No. 109–13, § 101(g)(2), 119 Stat.
231, 305 (repealing former section 207(a)(5) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a)(5) (2000)).
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statute narrowly in the specific facts of that case because the applicant’s
wife was not currently in the U.S. applying for asylum herself.154 He
found “implausible . . . [a] natural reaction of a husband whose wife has
been sterilized, and who deems it persecutive, . . . to then proceed to the
United States seeking asylum, leaving her behind.”155 Despite these
strong dissents, the holding from In re C—Y—Z— was reaffirmed some
nine years later by the BIA in the case In re S—L—L—.156
B. In re S—L—L—
In the S—L—L— case, the applicant was a native and citizen of
China who claimed asylum based on the allegation that “in September
1990 [the Chinese] government forced his girlfriend to abort their
child.”157 The applicant argued that the BIA should extend the holding in
C—Y—Z— to the applicant’s situation.158 An immigration judge refused,
concluding that the C—Y—Z— holding was limited to spouses, and
denied the applicant asylum.159 Without issuing an opinion, the BIA
affirmed the immigration judge’s decision prompting the applicant to
appeal to the Second Circuit.160 The Second Circuit remanded the case to
the BIA with instructions that it further explain its rationale in In re C—
Y—Z— for construing the CPC Refugee definition to grant per se asylum
eligibility to the spouses of direct persecution under CPC policies.161
On remand, the BIA reaffirmed, and made clear that In re C—Y—
Z—’s holding was limited to applicants who “opposed to a spouse’s
abortion or sterilization” and who was legally married to the spouse at
the time of the forced abortion or sterilization.162 The Board noted that
“[t]he interpretive lines, no matter where drawn, will be vulnerable to
criticism that they are over-inclusive, under-inclusive, inadequately tied
to statutory language, or unmanageable in practice.”163 However, the
Board concluded that the result of In re C—Y—Z— was consistent with
the legislative history regarding the CPC amendment.164 The Board also
noted Congress’s repeal of the 1,000 person annual maximum on asylum
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161

2006).
162
163
164

In re C—Y—Z—, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 936 (Villageliu, B.M., dissenting).
Id. at 935.
In re S—L—L—, 24 I. & N. Dec. 1, 2006 BIA LEXIS 21 (BIA Sept. 19, 2006).
Id. at *2–3.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id.
In re S—L—L—, 24 I. & N. Dec. 1, 2006 BIA LEXIS 21, at *1 (BIA Sept. 19,
Id. at *7.
Id. at *8.
Id.
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grants with respect to CPC-based claims as evidence of Congress’s intent
not to limit the scope of protection.165
While the BIA acknowledged that the CPC Refugee definition does
not specifically refer to spouses, it noted that the amendment “does not . .
. preclude an applicant from demonstrating past persecution based on
harm inflicted on a spouse when both spouses are harmed by government
acts motivated by a couple’s shared protected characteristic.”166 The BIA
explained that the purpose of the amendment was to “afford refugee
status to persons whose fundamental human rights were violated by a
government’s application of its coercive family planning policy.”167
Further, The Board noted that when Congress enacted the amendment, it
appeared concerned with the persecution of the woman as well as the
persecution of the couple as one entity through governmental
interference in a married couple’s family planning decisions.168
The Board reasoned that a forced abortion or sterilization is an
infringement on a married couple’s shared reproductive rights.169
According to the BIA, Chinese family planning policies impose shared
responsibility on a couple for complying with the law, so the Board was
“willing to presume, in absence of evidence to the contrary, that the
[g]overnment focuses on the married couple as a unit when it intervenes
to force an abortion.”170 The Board recognized that “a husband can also
suffer emotional and sympathetic harm arising from his spouse’s
mistreatment” and that this constituted a deprivation of rights to the
couple as an entity.171 Therefore, the BIA interpreted the forced abortion
and sterilization clause of section 101(a)(42) “in light of the overall
purpose of the amendment, to include both parties to a marriage.”172
165
Id. at *9. See REAL ID Act of 2005, Div. B of Pub. L. No. 109–13, § 101(g)(2),
119 Stat. 231, 305 (repealing former section 207(a)(5) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a)(5)
(2000)).
166
In re S—L—L—, 24 I. & N. Dec. 1, 2006 BIA LEXIS 21, at *10 (BIA Sept. 19,
2006).
167
Id. at *11. See Coercive Population Control in China: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. On Int’l Operations & Human Rights of the House Comm. On Int’l Relations,
104th Cong (1995); Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 559 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating that
“Congress’s goal in passing the amendments [was] to provide relief for ‘couples’
persecuted on account of an ‘unauthorized’ pregnancy and to keep families together.”
(citing H.R. REP. NO. 104—469(I), at 174 (1996))).
168
In re S—L—L—, 24 I. & N. Dec. 1, 2006 BIA LEXIS 21, at *13 (BIA Sept. 19,
2006).
169
Id. at *16.
170
Id. at *14; see XIAN FA [Constitution] art. 25, 49 (1982) (P.R.C.).
171
In re S—L—L—, 24 I. & N. Dec. 1, 2006 BIA LEXIS 21, at *16 (BIA Sept. 19,
2006); Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221, 225–26 (3d Cir. 2004).
172
In re S—L—L—, 24 I. & N. Dec. 1, 2006 BIA LEXIS 21, at *18–19 (BIA Sept.
19, 2006).
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The BIA, however, drew the line at current husbands.173 The Board
refused to extend the holding from In re C—Y—Z— to an applicant with
a girlfriend or fiancée that was a victim of a forced abortion.174 The BIA
noted that, “[f]rom the point of view of the wife, the local community,
and the government, a husband shares significantly more responsibility
in determining, with his wife, whether to bear a child in face of societal
pressure and government incentives than does a boyfriend or fiancé for
the resolution of a pregnancy of a girlfriend or fiancée.”175
In a concurring and dissenting opinion, Board Member Filppu
criticized the majority’s lack of analysis of the statutory text and the
majority’s reliance on the “construct of family entity persecution” in
reaching its decision.176 He argued that, by interpreting the statute “in
light of the overall purpose” of the amendment, the majority “never
explain[ed] . . . how [that] text is actually ambiguous on the question of
covering married couples, as opposed to all couples or just
individuals.”177 Board Member Filppu also rejected the contention
mentioned in Board Member Pauley’s concurrence that the majority
ruling should be upheld because of stare decisis.178 Stare decisis, Board
Member Filppu argued, was “an insufficient basis for defending our rule
as against the law enacted by Congress, and conforming to that law is
surely a sound reason for departing from past precedent.”179
Despite Board Member Filppu’s arguments, the Third Circuit’s
decision in Chen v. Attorney General of the United States further
established the principle that one spouse can impute a forced abortion or
sterilization to the other spouse.180
While the majority in C—Y—Z— arrived at its holding by focusing
on the clear intent of Congress, the majority in S—L—L— reaffirmed the
C—Y—Z—’s holding using a broader analysis to include considerations
of the couple’s shared, protected characteristics.181 Despite the BIA’s
unambiguous interpretation of the CPC Refugee definition, the circuit
courts have struggled to determine who is eligible for asylum under this
new legislation.
173

Id.
Id.
175
Id. at *19.
176
In re S—L—L—, 24 I. & N. Dec. 1, 2006 BIA LEXIS 21 at *44 (Filppu, B.M..,
concurring and dissenting).
177
Id. at *36.
178
Id. at *49–50.
179
Id. at 50.
180
Chen v. Att’y Gen., 491 F.3d 100 (3d Cir. 2007).
181
In re C—Y—Z—, 21 I. & N. Dec. 915, 917 (BIA 1997); In re S—L—L—, 24 I. &
N. Dec. 1, 2006 BIA LEXIS 21, at *1 (BIA Sept. 19, 2006).
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IV. INTERPRETATIONS OF THE CPC REFUGEE DEFINITION IN THE
CIRCUIT COURTS
Several circuits have adopted, and in some cases, even extended the
BIA’s interpretation of the CPC Refugee definition.182 The Ninth Circuit
in He v. Ashcroft upheld the BIA’s interpretation as reasonable,183 and in
Ma v. Ashcroft, it extended asylum to spouses in illegal marriages, such
as those who marry in traditional ceremonies not recognized by the
applicant’s government.184 In Zhang v. Gonzales, the Seventh Circuit
also expanded its interpretation of the scope of asylum protection under
the CPC Refugee definition to former spouses.185 Finally, the Third
Circuit in Chen v. Attorney General of the United States upheld the
BIA’s interpretation of the statute, granting per se asylum eligibility to a
spouse of a victim directly persecuted through CPC policies.186
A. He v. Ashcroft
The Ninth Circuit case He v. Ashcroft involved a petitioner
requesting asylum on the basis of his wife’s past persecution from
involuntary sterilization.187 Initially, the BIA found that the petitioner,
Mr. He, was not credible, and declined to find persecution by the
Chinese government against Mr. He when it subjected his wife to
involuntary sterilization.188 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding
Mr. He eligible for asylum adopting the holding of C—Y—Z— that “the
forced sterilization of one spouse . . . is an act of persecution against the
other spouse.” 189 The court explained that, if on remand the BIA
accepted Mr. He’s claims as true, then Mr. He would necessarily be
eligible for asylum under the BIA’s interpretation of the CPC Refugee
definition.190
B. Ma v. Ashcroft
After He v. Ashcroft upheld the BIA’s interpretation of the CPC
Refugee definition, Ma v. Ashcroft extended the application of the
definition. In Ma v. Ashcroft, the Ninth Circuit addressed whether the
182
Chen v. Att’y Gen., 491 F.3d 100 (3d Cir. 2007); Zhang v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 993
(7th Cir. 2006); Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553 (9th Cir. 2004); He v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d
593 (9th Cir. 2003).
183
He v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 593, 605 (9th Cir. 2003).
184
Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 561 (9th Cir. 2004).
185
Zhang v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 993, 1001 (7th Cir. 2006).
186
Chen v. Att’y Gen. of the United States, 491 F.3d 100, 108 (3d Cir. 2007).
187
He, 328 F.3d at 593.
188
Id. at 594.
189
Id. at 604 (quoting In re C—Y—Z—, 21 I. & N. Dec. 915, 919–20 (BIA 1997)).
190
He, 328 F.3d at 604.
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court should deny per se asylum eligibility to husbands within marriages
not sanctioned by the Chinese government. 191 The court acknowledged
that the BIA’s rule restricted relief to legally registered spouses;
however, the Ma court extended relief to Ma’s husband even though their
marriage was “underage” and could not be “legally registered.”192
The Ninth Circuit justified its deviation from the BIA’s
interpretation by stating that the “[a]pplication of the BIA’s rule would
result in the separation of a husband and wife, the break-up of a family, a
result that is at odds not only with the provision at issue here, but also
with significant parts of our overall immigration policy.”193 Accordingly,
the court of appeals held that the CPC Refugee definition protected
husbands in government-sanctioned marriages, as well as those
marriages the government disapproved of, “but for China’s coercive
family planning policies.”194 Because the prohibition of “underage”
marriages is essential to the success of CPC policies and the reduction of
child-bearing in China, the court held that limiting asylum to exclude
spouses of underage marriages would conflict with the policies and
purposes of the amendment.195
C. Zhang v. Gonzales
While the Ninth Circuit held extended refugee status to spouses of
CPC victims in underage marriages, the Seventh Circuit faced the
question of whether CPC Refugee status could be applied to former
spouses of the CPC victims. In the Seventh Circuit case Zhang v.
Gonzales, Mr. Zhang, a native of China, claimed the government forced
his wife to have an abortion when he and his wife had not yet attained
the legal marrying age in China.196 Because his wife was undoubtedly a
direct victim of China’s CPC policies, the court found that “Zhang was a
victim as well.”197 Therefore, the court held that the forced abortion
deprived Zhang not only of his unborn child, but also his ability to parent
that unborn child, a loss that the subsequent break-up of the marriage
could not lessen.198
The Seventh Circuit noted that the BIA and other courts have
rejected arguments that a spouse whose wife was a victim of forced

191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198

Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 559 (9th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 561.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 560.
Zhang v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 993, 995 (7th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 1001.
Id.
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sterilization “had no fear of future persecution because her involuntary
sterilization removed any threat of future sterilization or forcible
abortions.”199 The court of appeals cited to Qu v. Gonzales, a Ninth
Circuit case that asserted, “the act of forced sterilization is not a discrete
act, but rather a permanent and continuous form of persecution that
deprives the couple of the child or children who might have eventually
been born to them.”200 The Zhang decision received further support from
the BIA’s holding in Y—T—L— that “persons who have suffered
involuntary sterilization have a well-founded fear of future persecution
because they will be persecuted for the remainder of their lives due to
that sterilization.”201
D. Chen v. Attorney General of the United States
Since the enactment of the CPC Refugee amendment, the Ninth and
Seventh Circuits have extended the BIA’s interpretation of the CPC
definition. Markedly, the Third Circuit recently upheld the BIA’s
interpretation over a vigorous dissent. In Chen v. Attorney General of the
United States, the court upheld that the BIA’s interpretation of the CPC
Refugee definition permitting one spouse to impute the forced abortion
or involuntary sterilization to the other spouse to be reasonable and
applicable to claims based on “persecution [that] lies exclusively in the
future.”202
The court based this conclusion on the considerations of loss of
reproductive opportunities by the couple, the sympathetic harm
experienced by the husband, and China’s punishment of the married
couple for violations of the “one-child” policy.203 The Third Circuit also
noted that the legislative history behind the CPC Refugee definition
“does not run counter” to Chen’s holding and that Congress has
suggested a desire to expand relief to spouses.204
Judge McKee, concurring in part and dissenting in part, suggested
that because Congress did not include the word “spouse” in the statute,
therefore the majority was prohibited from extending the language to
include spouses.205 According to Judge McKee, the court erred in looking
beyond the current language of the CPC Refugee definition in deciding

199

Id. (citing Qu v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 2004) and In re Y—T—L—,
23 I. & N. Dec. 601 (BIA 2003)).
200
Zhang, 434 F.3d at 1001–02 (citing Qu, 399 F.3d at 1202).
201
Zhang, 434 F.3d at 1002 (citing Y—T—L , 23 I. & N. Dec. at 607).
202
Chen v. Att’y Gen., 491 F.3d 100, 108–09 (3d Cir. 2007).
203
Id. at 108.
204
Id.
205
Chen, 491 F.3d at 113 (McKee, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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the case.206 He added that the Board had no more expertise on “notion of
the marital relationship” than it did on “parenting, matters of religion, or
the proper temperature for cooking leg of lamb.”207 Therefore, Judge
McKee was unwilling to defer to the BIA’s interpretations of procreation
and marriage.208
Because the individuals seeking asylum based on persecution under
the “one-child” policy are in different types of personal relationships
with the CPC victim, the circuit courts have struggled to interpret who is
eligible for asylum under the Immigration and Nationality Act, as
amended by the CPC Refugee definition.209 Despite the differences in
marital status in each of the cases discussed above, the courts either
adopted or extended the BIA’s interpretation of the CPC Refugee
definition because such an interpretation furthered the purposes of the
amendment to protect those whose human rights have been violated by
CPC policies.210 However, the Second Circuit’s subsequent decision in
Lin v. United States Department of Justice reached a contradictory
conclusion.
V. LIN V. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
In contrast to the holdings of the cases mentioned above, in Lin v.
United States. Department of Justice, the Second Circuit overlooked the
BIA’s interpretation of the CPC Refugee definition.211 The court held
that the provision did not grant automatic refugee status to spouses of
individuals subjected to an involuntary abortion or sterilization.212 The
Second Circuit acknowledged that, in the past, the court had followed the
BIA’s holding in C—Y—Z—, but explained that for the Lin holding, “[t]o
the extent that deference implicit in these cases can be read to say that
deference is due, they are overruled.”213
206

Id. at 114.
Id. at 116.
208
Id.
209
Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006), as
amended by the Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(“IIRIRA”), Division C, Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No.
104–208, § 601(a)(1), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009–689.
210
In re S—L—L—, 24 I. & N. Dec. 1, 2006 BIA LEXIS 21, at *11 (BIA Sept. 19,
2006); See Coercive Population Control in China: Hearings Before the Subcomm. On
Int’l Operations & Human Rights of the House Comm. On Int’l Relations, 104th Cong
(1995); Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 559 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating that “Congress’s goal
in passing the amendments [was] to provide relief for ‘couples’ persecuted on account of
an ‘unauthorized’ pregnancy and to keep families together.” (citing H.R. REP. NO. 104—
469(I), at 174 (1996))).
211
Lin v. Dep’t of Justice, 494 F.3d 296 (2d Cir. 2007).
212
Lin, 494 F.3d at 300.
213
Id. at 305.
207
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In S—L—L—, the BIA had observed that there was “no clear or
obvious answer to the scope of the protections afforded by the
amendment to partners of persons forced to submit to an abortion or
sterilization.”214 However, the Second Circuit applied the Chevron test
and disagreed with the BIA to find that Congress had spoken
unambiguously.215
The Lin court focused on the plain language of the statute, which
refers to “a person” rather than “a couple.”216 The court noted that
“[n]othing in the general definition of refugee would permit ‘any person’
who has not personally experienced persecution or a well founded fear of
future persecution on a protected ground to obtain asylum, as the BIA’s
per se rule would permit.”217 The court added that “[i]f this conclusion is
inconsistent with Congress’s intentions, it can, if it so chooses, of course,
amend the statute . . . .”218
However, the court did not articulate why a husband whose wife
had a forced abortion or sterilization is not personally subject to
persecution in the form of infringement on his reproductive rights,
emotional and sympathetic suffering, and his exposure to punishment for
violations of the “one-child” policy. In holding the statute unambiguous,
the Second Circuit found no need to consider its legislative history;219
however, the court proceeded to examine the legislative history to find
further support that its holding comported with the Congressional intent
behind the amendment.220 Nonetheless, the court misinterpreted the
legislative history of the statute.221 In C—Y—Z—,222 the BIA first
announced the rule that one spouse could attain per se refugee status
based on past persecution by coerced abortion or sterilization of the other
spouse. Because the BIA’s decision in S—L—L—223 reaffirmed C—Y—
Z—, the Second Circuit in Lin saw “no reason to remand yet again—ping

214

In re S—L—L—, 24 I. & N. Dec. 1 2006 BIA LEXIS 21, at *8 (BIA Sept. 19,

2006).
215

Lin, 494 F.3d at 304–05.
Id. at 305.
Id. at 306.
218
Id. at 309 n.10.
219
Id. at 310.
220
Id. The court found that the Congress did not intend to extend relief to those who
were not subjected to persecution themselves. Lin, 494 F.3d, at 310–11. In arriving at this
conclusion, the court relied on a House of Representatives report which did not explicitly
mention spouses of forced abortion or sterilization victims. Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO.
104—469(I), at 173–74 (1996)).
221
See id.
222
In re C—Y—Z—, 21 I. & N. Dec. 915 (BIA 1997).
223
In re S—L—L—, 24 I. & N. Dec. 1, 2006 BIA LEXIS 21, at *15–21 (BIA Sept.
19, 2006).
216
217
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pong style—when the BIA has had ten years and several opportunities to
reconsider a rule that has no basis in statutory text.”224
Judge Katzman’s concurring opinion noted that “the majority has
gone out of its way to create a circuit split where none need exist . . .
thereby frustrating the BIA’s uniform enforcement of a national
immigration policy.”225 The judge also suggested that the majority should
have examined the context and “the entirety of [the Immigration and
Nationality Act] 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) to determine whether the statute
is ambiguous.”226 Instead, Judge Katzman accused the majority of
finding “in silence clear evidence of Congress’s intent.”227 He further
added that Congress had done nothing to foreclose automatic extension
of relief to spouses “since the amendment’s enactment, notwithstanding
that the BIA interpreted § 1101(a)(42) to cover spouses a decade ago and
numerous courts of appeals have upheld this interpretation as
reasonable.”228
In a concurring opinion, Judge Sotomayor argued that the question
reached by the majority was unnecessary to resolve.229 She also noted
that in the immigration context “‘judicial deference to the Executive
Branch is especially appropriate.’”230 Judge Sotomayer added that the
majority had “started a domino effect that may have significant and
unforeseen repercussions” in failing to accord such deference.231
Judge Calabresi, in his dissent, also stressed a fear of repercussions,
explaining that “70-80 percent of the [petitioners in our court] are
Chinese seeking asylum to escape their homeland’s family planning
policies.”232 Judge Calabresi added that “the majority opinion keeps the
224

Lin v. Dep’t of Justice, 494 F.3d 296, 313 n.15 (2d Cir. 2007).
Lin, 494 F.3d at 316 (Katzman, J., concurring), (“‘[I]t would be unsound for each
of the several Courts of Appeals to elaborate a potentially nonuniform body of law’ and
describing uniformity as ‘especially desirable in cases such as these.’” Lin, 494 F.3d at
316 (citing Jian Hui Shao v. BIA, 465 F.3d 497, 502 (2d Cir. 2006))).
226
Lin, 494 F.3d at 317–18 (Katzman, J., concurring).
227
Id. at 319 n.7.
228
Id. at 323. See, e.g., Zhang v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 993, 999 (7th Cir. 2006); Yuan
v. Dep’t of Justice, 416 F.3d 192, 197 (2d Cir. 2005) (noting the Second Circuit followed
the lead of the BIA, “affording the INS the typical deference it deserves when
interpreting its own regulations”); Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 559 (9th Cir. 2004)
(“The BIA and the courts have uniformly applied that statute’s protections to husbands
whose wives have undergone abortions or sterilization procedures, as well as to the wives
themselves.”) (citations omitted).
229
Lin, 494 F.3d at 334 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
230
Id. (citing INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999) (quoting INS v.
Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 110 (1988)).
231
Lin, 494 F.3d at 334.
232
Lin, 494 F.3d at 338 (Calabresi, J., dissenting in part) (citing BIA Appeals Remain
High in 2nd and 9th Circuits, The Third Branch: Newsletter of the Fed. Cts. (Admin.
Office of the U.S. Cts. Office of Pub. Affairs, D.C.), Feb. 2005, available at
225
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agency from doing what administrative agencies do best, namely, using
their expertise to covert general statutes into specific rules that best
reflect an underlying legislative intent.”233 He warned, “[i]t is not proper
for appellate courts to speak for the BIA . . . before the agency has had a
full and focused opportunity to make its position clear.”234
By failing to adhere to the BIA’s interpretation of the CPC Refugee
definition as other circuit courts had done, the Second Circuit’s decision
in Lin court created a circuit split.235 This lack of uniform interpretation
is undesirable as it undermines uniform national immigration policy236
and contradicts family reunification goals.237 With every passing day, the
Second Circuit’s decision tears more families apart because derivative
asylum is an unavailable remedy.238 Consequently, the Supreme Court
should address Lin’s holding and interpret the CPC Refugee definition in
favor of the BIA’s interpretation, or Congress should overturn Lin by
amending the CPC Refugee definition to explicitly include the words
“spouse” or “couple.”
VI. THE LIN DECISION SHOULD BE OVERTURNED
As a result of the Lin decision, families victimized by CPC are
being separated239 and a there has been a surge in the number of appeals
before the BIA from those applicants in the Second Circuit.240 If the

http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/feb05ttb/bia/index.html (citing statement of Elizabeth
Cronin)).
233
Lin, 494 F.3d at 338–39 (Calabresi, J., dissenting in part).
234
Id. at 343 n.6.
235
Lin, 494 F.3d at 300 n.4. Regarding section 601(a), a number of circuits have given
deference to the BIA’s interpretation. See, e.g., Sun Wen Chen v. Att’y Gen., 491 F.3d
100 (3d Cir. 2007); Zhang v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 993, 1001 (7th Cir. 2006); Huang v.
Ashcroft, 113 Fed. App’x 695, 700 (6th Cir. 2004) (unpublished opinion); Li v. Ashcroft,
82 Fed. App’x 357, 358 (5th Cir. 2003) (unpublished per curiam opinion); He v.
Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 593, 604 (9th Cir. 2003).
236
Lin, 494 F.3d at 316 (Katzman, J., concurring).
237
In re S—L—L—, 24 I. & N. Dec. 1, 2006 BIA LEXIS 21, at *11 (BIA Sept. 19,
2006) (see Coercive Population Control in China: Hearings Before the Subcomm. On
Int’l Operations & Human Rights of the House Comm. On Int’l Relations, 104th Cong
(1995); see also, Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 559 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating that
“Congress’s goal in passing the amendments [was] to provide relief for ‘couples’
persecuted on account of an ‘unauthorized’ pregnancy and to keep families together.”
(citing H.R. REP. NO. 104—469(I), at 174 (1996))).
238
See cases cited, supra note 42.
239
Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 561 (9th Cir. 2004).
240
See Lin, 494 F.3d at 338 (Calabresi, J., dissenting in part) (citing BIA Appeals
Remain High in 2nd and 9th Circuits, The Third Branch: Newsletter of the Fed. Cts.
(Admin. Office of the U.S. Cts. Office of Pub. Affairs, D.C.), Feb. 2005, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/feb05ttb/bia/index.html (citing statement of Elizabeth
Cronin)).
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Supreme Court assumes the issue presented by Lin, it must take into
account a number of considerations. The erroneous interpretation of the
CPC Refugee definition by the Lin court could have been avoided by
correctly applying Chevron deference to the BIA’s interpretation of the
CPC Refugee definition. Additionally, this interpretation is reasonable,
given that the purpose of the CPC Refugee definition is to protect those
whose human rights have been violated.241 Here, the rights of both
members in the couple have been violated and are deserving of asylum
protection. Such interpretation is also supported by the statute’s
legislative history.242 Moreover, applying the BIA’s interpretation of the
CPC Refugee definition provides an additional basis of asylum for
spouses of CPC victims that is not foreclosed by the availability of
derivative asylum.243
Alternatively, Congress should effectively overturn Lin by
amending the CPC Refugee definition. Because the Chinese government
imposes responsibility on both the husband and wife to comply with the
“one-child” policy,244 the CPC Refugee definition must accordingly
protect both members of the couple. Congress should also confront the
Lin decision because it undermines family reunification—“one of the
principal goals” of established refugee doctrine and U.S. immigration
policy.245 Amending the statute to explicitly include spouses of CPC
victims would promote certainty in the application of refugee law246 and
ensure uniformity among the circuit courts. Either the Supreme Court or
Congress should exercise respective powers to ensure that the CPC
Refugee definition is properly extended to spouses of CPC victims.
A. The Lin Court Failed to Properly Apply BIA Deference
As an administrative agency with expertise in immigration matters,
the BIA’s statutory interpretations are entitled to Chevron deference. The
241
In re S—L—L—, 24 I. & N. Dec. 1, 2006 BIA LEXIS 21, at *11 (BIA 2006). See
Coercive Population Control in China: Hearings Before the Subcomm. On Int’l
Operations & Human Rights of the House Comm. On Int’l Relations, 104th Cong (1995);
Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 559 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating that “Congress’s goal in
passing the amendments [was] to provide relief for ‘couples’ persecuted on account of an
‘unauthorized’ pregnancy and to keep families together.” (citing H.R. REP. NO. 104—
469(I), at 174 (1996))).
242
In re S—L—L—, 24 I. & N. Dec. 1, 2006 BIA LEXIS 21, at *16.
243
Lin, 494 F.3d at 325 (Katzman, J., concurring); see also Chen, 491 F.3d at 107
(“We . . . do not believe that the existence of derivative asylum status under a statute
implies that Congress intended to foreclose additional pathways to asylum specific to
spouses.”).
244
XIAN FA [Constitution] art. 49 (1982) (P.R.C.).
245
See cases cited, supra note 28.
246
See Lin, 494 F.3d at 316 (Katzman, J., concurring).
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Chevron doctrine specifically grants agency interpretations of
Congressional statutes higher deference.247 Sister circuits that find the
CPC Refugee definition ambiguous have addressed the second inquiry in
Chevron to conclude that the BIA’s interpretation is reasonable.248 The
BIA itself noted that “[t]he interpretive lines, no matter where drawn,
will be vulnerable to criticism . . . .”249
On the other hand, the Second Circuit found the statutory language
to be unambiguous.250 The court reasoned that, because the statute only
mentioned a “person” and not a “spouse” or “couple,” therefore asylum
did not extend beyond the female victim of persecution.251 The Lin court
erred in failing to recognize the CPC Refugee definition as ambiguous,
which would warrant deference to the BIA’s interpretation under the
Chevron analysis.252 The CPC Refugee definition “contains an ambiguity
that the BIA is empowered to fill”253 and was enacted to expand the
availability of asylum relief.254 Because of this error, the court never
embarked on the second inquiry in Chevron 255 to determine whether the
BIA’s interpretation constituted “a permissible construction of the
statute.”256 By mistakenly concluding that the CPC Refugee definition
was unambiguous, the Second Circuit failed to give proper deference to
the BIA’s interpretation of the CPC Refugee definition.257 The Lin
holding has thus frustrated the BIA’s efforts to achieve uniformity in
U.S. national immigration policy.258
The BIA’s interpretation of the CPC Refugee definition was most
recently upheld by the courts as reasonable in Chen, when the Third
Circuit extended CPC Refugee status to spouses of individuals directly
persecuted under CPC policies.259 The BIA has addressed whether the
text of the CPC Refugee definition is clear or ambiguous “in light of the
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Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837.
See, e.g., Zhang v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 993, 1001 (7th Cir. 2006); Huang v.
Ashcroft, 113 Fed. App’x 695, 700 (6th Cir. 2004) (unpublished opinion); Li v. Ashcroft,
82 Fed. App’x 357, 358 (5th Cir. 2003) (unpublished per curiam opinion); He v.
Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 593, 604 (9th Cir. 2003).
249
In re S—L—L—, 24 I. & N. Dec. 1, 2006 BIA LEXIS 21, at *8 (BIA Sept. 19,
2006).
250
Lin, 494 F.3d at 304.
251
Id. at 305.
252
Lin v. Dep’t of Justice, 494 F.3d 296, 304 (2d Cir. 2007).
253
Chen v. Att’y Gen., 491 F.3d 100, 105 (3d Cir. 2007).
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Lin, 494 F.3d at 307 n.8.
255
See id.
256
Id. (citing Chevron, 467 U.S at 843).
257
Lin, 494 F.3d at 327–29 (2d Cir. 2007) (Sotomayer, J., concurring).
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Lin, 494 F.3d at 316 (Katzman, J., concurring).
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Chen v. Att’y Gen., 491 F.3d 100, 108 (3d Cir. 2007).
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overall purpose” of the coercive population control amendment.260 In
addition, “the lack of such a reference” to spouses in the text of the CPC
Refugee definition amendment, “however, does not necessarily preclude
an applicant from demonstrating past persecution based on harm inflicted
on a spouse when both spouses are harmed by government acts
motivated by a couple’s shared protected characteristic.”261
In Chen, the Third Circuit recognized that persecution of one
spouse “will directly affect the reproductive opportunities of the other
spouse,” and thereby concluded that the BIA’s interpretation was
reasonable.262 The BIA acknowledged that the CPC amendment does not
explicitly address spouses, but based on the Board’s notion of the marital
relationship and knowledge of China’s one-child policy, the BIA
concluded “that the scope of this particular type of persecution
extend[ed] to both spouses.”263 The BIA has employed its gap-filling
authority in a reasonable manner.264 Its interpretation is particularly
reasonable when viewed in the context of the distinct purpose of the CPC
Refugee amendment to protect individuals whose human rights have
been violated through CPC policies.265 When enforcement of CPC
policies against a married couple results in an infringement on the
couple’s reproductive opportunities,266 it is be reasonable to conclude
that the husband’s human rights have been violated and deserve the
protection the CPC Refugee definition is meant to provide.
The legislative history of the Immigration and Nationality Act and
the CPC Refugee definition also supports the BIA’s interpretation.267
Congress enacted the CPC Refugee definition to provide an expansion of
asylum relief to people suffering violations of fundamental human rights
through governmental applications of CPC policies.268 Congress’s

260

In re S—L—L—, 24 I. & N. Dec. 1, 2006 BIA LEXIS 21, at *18.
Id. at *10.
262
Chen, 491 F.3d at 108.
263
Id. at 107 (citing In re S—L—L—, 24 I. & N. Dec. 1, 7 (BIA 2006)).
264
Chen, 491 F.3d at 108.
265
In re S—L—L—, 24 I. & N. Dec. 1, 2006 BIA LEXIS 21, at *11 (BIA 2006). See
Coercive Population Control in China: Hearings Before the Subcomm. On Int’l
Operations & Human Rights of the House Comm. On Int’l Relations, 104th Cong (1995);
Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 559 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating that “Congress’s goal in
passing the amendments [was] to provide relief for ‘couples’ persecuted on account of an
‘unauthorized’ pregnancy and to keep families together.” (citing H.R. REP. NO. 104—
469(I), at 174 (1996))).
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In re S—L—L—, 24 I. & N. Dec. 1, 2006 BIA LEXIS 21, at *16.
267
Id.
268
Lin v. Dep’t of Justice, 494 F.3d 296, 318–21 (2d Cir. 2007) (Katzman, J.,
concurring) (referencing the House Committee Report regarding section 601 which
explained that “Congress’s ‘primary intent’ in amending the definition of refugee was ‘to
261
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intention to expand relief is also evidenced by the repeal of the 1,000
annual cap of asylum grants.269 In light of this Congressional intent, the
BIA is correct in interpreting the statutory language within context, and
the Lin court should not have rejected such a reasonable interpretation.
Courts including the Third and Ninth Circuits have explicitly
concluded that Congress’s intention in enacting the 1996 amendment
was to protect both members of a couple.270 In particular, the Ma case
emphasized the need to keep families together.271 Over ten years ago in
C—Y—Z—, the BIA interpreted the CPC Refugee definition to
acknowledge these principles, and numerous courts of appeals have since
upheld the BIA’s interpretation as reasonable.272 Under these
circumstances, “judicial deference to the Executive Branch is especially
appropriate.”273
Moreover, the BIA’s interpretation of the CPC Refugee definition
to afford relief to spouses of individuals who were directly persecuted
under CPC policies comports with the derivative asylum statute, because
the BIA is able to provide an additional basis for asylum relief to
spouses.274 Although the majority in Lin claimed that providing per se
eligibility to spouses would conflict with the derivative asylum status
granted under section 1158,275 the availability of derivative asylum relief
does not necessarily preclude the BIA “from providing an additional

overturn several decisions of the [BIA], principally Matter of Chang and Matter of G—. .
. .’” Id. at 320. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 104–469, pt. I, at 173 (1996)).
269
REAL ID Act of 2005, Div. B of Pub. L. No. 109–13, § 101(g)(2), 119 Stat. 231,
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Lin, 494 F.3d at 323 (Katzman, J., concurring); see, e.g., Zhang v. Gonzales, 434
F.3d 993, 999 (7th Cir. 2006); Yuan v. Dep’t of Justice, 416 F.3d 192, 197 (2d Cir. 2005)
(noting that the Second Circuit followed the lead of the BIA, “affording the INS the
typical deference it deserves when interpreting its own regulations.”) Id. (citations
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applied that statute’s protections to husbands whose wives have undergone abortions or
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basis of relief.”276 As Judge Katzman’s concurrence in Lin recognizes,
the derivative asylum statute does not prevent the BIA from extending
CPC refugee status under the 1996 amendment.277 There is clearly no
tension between these two distinct forms of relief.278
In addition, derivative asylum may not be an adequate remedy in
many types of cases, such as those situations where marriages have
ended in death or divorce.”279 In other instances, the spouse may precede
his family to the U.S. for economic and other social reasons,280 but under
the Lin rule, that same spouse would not be eligible for asylum
derivatively if the spouse claiming protection under the CPC Refugee
definition is still in the home country. While these spouses are arguably
eligible under the derivative asylum statute, the BIA’s interpretation of
the CPC Refugee definition would allow such spouse to have an
independent basis for asylum when derivative asylum proves to be an
unavailable remedy.281 In an ideal world, the entire family could then
emigrate at the same time; however, economic and social realities make
that situation rare.
If the Supreme Court was to address this issue, the Court should
heed these considerations. When applying Chevron deference to BIA
decisions, the Court should find that the CPC Refugee definition is
ambiguous to begin the second inquiry of the analysis—whether such
interpretation constitutes “a permissible construction of the statute.”282
The Court should also find that the BIA’s interpretation is reasonable
give the purposes and legislative history of the CPC Refugee definition.
Finally, the Court should acknowledge that providing an additional form
of relief to spouses of CPC victims is encouraged and not foreclosed
simply through the availability of derivative asylum.283 Alternatively, if
276
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the Supreme Court does not address this issue, Congress should
effectively overturn the Lin decision by amending the CPC Refugee
definition to expressly include the words “spouse” or “couple.”
B. The CPC Refugee Definition Should Protect Persecuted Couples
Because the Chinese Government Persecutes Both Members for
Violations of the One-Child Policy and the U.S. Promotes Family
Reunification
China’s “one-child” policy persecutes the married couple as an
entity and “deprive[s] the couple of the natural fruits of conjugal life.”284
This policy, as well as the Constitution of the People’s Republic of
China, grants both the husband and wife a shared responsibility for
decisions relating to having a family.285 Therefore, the government
explicitly directs action against both husband and wife.286 A husband of a
spouse who has undergone a forced abortion or sterilization “also suffers
emotional and sympathetic harm.”287 The husband suffers as a result of
his wife’s persecution, so courts should therefore extend automatic
asylum eligibility to the husband.288
Furthermore, the Lin decision will create a domino effect,289 leading
to many negative consequences, including the unnecessary splintering of
families when a wife is granted asylum without her husband,290 a spike in
the immigration docket,291 and a disturbing failure to defer to agency
interpretations—a result that could undermine the maintenance of a
uniform national immigration policy.292
The Lin court acknowledged that its holding would substantially
impact families, but simply suggested that Congress had the power to
overturn the judicial precedent.293 This statement casts serious doubt on
the court’s assessment of the statute’s unambiguity. By simply relying on
284
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285
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2006).
286
Id. at *14.
287
Id. at *16.
288
See Chen, 491 F.3d at 108.
289
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(Admin. Office of the U.S. Cts. Office of Pub. Affairs, D.C.), Feb. 2005, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/feb05ttb/bia/index.html (citing statement of Elizabeth
Cronin)).
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J., concurring).
293
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Congress to eventually amend the statute, the Second Circuit has
carelessly disregarded the fate of thousands of asylum seekers and
families that are forcibly separated in the interim.294 Husbands of future
CPC victims whose cases will be decided under Lin will not be able to
obtain per se refugee status along with their wives, resulting in the
separation of families.295 Since 70–80 percent of the appellants in the
Second Circuit are Chinese citizens seeking asylum “to escape their
homeland’s family planning policies,”296 the Lin decision will
undoubtedly create “sweeping ramifications” on the court’s immigration
law docket.”297 Thousands of families will suffer separation in addition
to persecution, due to the Second Circuit’s haste in neglecting to follow a
workable BIA interpretation that has been in place for over a decade.298
Most importantly, the purpose of the 1996 amendment seeks to
provide protection for victims of persecution from China’s coercive
family planning policies.299 However, this protection remains incomplete
if a victim is afforded asylum without her spouse,300 because the presence
of a spouse allows the victim to establish herself more quickly in our
society by facilitating the integration process.301 As one scholar
explained, family reunification is the only way to restore a persecution
victim’s dignity.302 The break-up of a family is not only “a result that is
at odds with the provision at issue here,” but is also at odds “with
significant parts of our overall immigration policy.”303
294
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The executive branch treats the nuclear family as one unit, “even
when temporary immigration status is at issue.”304 Because the courts
have recognized the family unit’s crucial societal role and family
reunification policy underlies U.S. immigration policy in general,305 the
BIA’s interpretation of the statute is reasonable and accords with the
overall purpose of the statute. Thus, the Second Circuit in Lin erred in
determining the statute as unambiguous, and in failing to defer to the
BIA’s reasonable interpretation.
Although the three appellants in Lin were all unmarried,306 the court
unnecessarily proceeded to decide how the CPC Refugee definition
applied to legally married spouses,307 and in doing so, created a split
among the circuits. Moreover, the Second Circuit also held that the
statute did not extend per se asylum status to “boyfriends or fiancés of
individuals who have been persecuted directly under [CPC] policies.”308
However, the Third Circuit in Chen noted that characterizing reliance on
marital status in C—Y—Z— as arbitrary and capricious would be absurd
because benefits and presumptions based on marriage are prevalent in
other areas of law.309
The BIA has stated that the marriage requirement “is a practical and
manageable approach which takes into account the language and purpose
of the statutory definition in light of the general principles of asylum
law.”310 Hence, the marriage requirement creates certainty and
administrative feasibility, which is desirable particularly in immigration
law.311
The Second Circuit in Lin was incorrect in refusing to extend
automatic refugee status to spouses of individuals persecuted by an
involuntary abortion or sterilization. To avoid further damaging
applications of the CPC Refugee definition, Congress should amend the
statute to explicitly include both members of the couple. Such an
amendment would clarify the CPC Refugee definition to guarantee
protection to both members of the couple, in tandem with the explicit
responsibility the Chinese government places on couples to comply with
304
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the “one-child” policy.312 Ensuring that the spouse of a CPC victim is
afforded protection under the CPC Refugee definition promotes the goals
of U.S. family reunification policy313 and ensures judicial certainty in the
application of the statute.314 Therefore, either the Supreme Court or
Congress should assert powers to rectify the Second Circuit’s
interpretation of the CPC Refugee definition in Lin.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Lin decision has frustrated any uniform application of the CPC
Refugee definition.315 Consequently, the holding will likely impose
“sweeping ramifications”316 on the immigration law docket. In similar
cases, deference to the executive branch is appropriate.317 By incorrectly
finding the CPC Refugee definition unambiguous, the Lin court
answered an unnecessary question.318 The Second Circuit’s decision is
inconsistent with the legislative history of the CPC Refugee definition
and fails to offer complete protection to both persecuted members of the
couple, who are equally responsible for adhering to the “one-child”
policy under the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China.319
Most importantly, an interpretation of the CPC Refugee definition
that includes spouses ensures that families stay together. Granting
asylum only to a wife is insufficient without also granting her husband
the same protection; a wife cannot achieve the restoration of her dignity
nor peace of mind unless her husband is also granted asylum.320
Furthermore, derivative asylum is not always available to the husband,
particularly when the spouse claiming protection under the CPC Refugee
definition is still located in the home country.321 This necessitates
312
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automatic asylum for the husband of a CPC victim, to enable him to
petition for protection from CPC policies on the basis on his own
individual persecution.
Though some criticize the BIA for the deteriorating quality of its
work, C—Y—Z— and S—L—L— signify the Board’s strength as an
interpretive body when it issues well-reasoned decisions instead of
summary affirmances.322 In light of C—Y—Z— and S—L—L—, the
circuit courts still struggle to apply the BIA’s interpretation of who is
eligible for automatic asylum under the CPC Refugee definition.323
Accordingly, the Supreme Court or Congress must act.
The Court must address the interpretation of the CPC Refugee
definition or Congress must effectively overturn Lin by amending the
CPC Refugee definition to explicitly provide relief to both spouses. If the
Second Circuit decision is not overturned, or if other circuits adopt its
approach, thousands of husbands will be denied their human right to
raise a family—a denial in the hands of the circuit courts of appeals. The
freedoms, values, and ideals in the United States of America create a
refuge for those suffering persecution on a daily basis in their home
countries, and by denying a husband of a CPC victim the asylum he
deserves, the Second Circuit shattered the basic rights of the family
institution that America so vigorously protects.
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